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In the first decade of the twentieth century the Queensland 
labour movement recovered and expanded remarkably after the decimating 
period of drought, depression and government and employer hostility in 
the 1890s. With an economic upsurge beginning in 1905, both the numbers 
and membership of trade unions grew rapidly, enhancing the Labor Party's 
prospects for increased electoral support and parliamentary 
representation. The growth of the Australian Workers' Union CAWUI in 
the western pastoral districts and the formation of the first sugar 
workers' unions in the north exemplified the spectacular revival of 
unionism. The most vigorous and important role in this state-wide 
labour rejuvenation, however, was played by the Amalgamated Workers' 
Association CAWA] which was formed in 1907 in the mining fields west of 
the Atherton tableland in the far north. 
Within five years of its inauspicious birth the AWA achieved 
a pre-eminent position in the Queensland labour movement; it had a 
decisive influence on the direction of both trade union and Labor Party 
development. The rise of the AWA was accompanied by the spread of 
unionism among other northern workers - a phenomenon greatly encouraged 
and influenced by the example of the AWA and the propaganda of its 
leaders. Industrial growth and re-organization initiated by the AWA 
heralded remarkable political success, beginning a long period in which 
North Queensland was a safe Labor stronghold. It was the AWA which was 
the dynamic force in the creation of the new AWU in Queensland in 1913, 
when the northern union amalgamated with the southern and western AWU 
organization. Indeed, the AWA laid the basis for industrial and 
political alignments in the state for many years. 
The importance of the AWA is demonstrated by the attention 
focussed on it by historians. For instance, a recent article by Kett 
Kennedy traces the union's history up to its merger with the AWU. 
Kennedy concentrates on the AWA after it moved out of the far north. 
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absorbing a number of other infant trade unions in December 1910. This 
perspective is eminently justifiable since it was particularly after the 
1910 amalgamation that the union emerged as the largest, most militant 
and most progressive union in the state - the result of its victory in 
the 1911 sugar strike, its subsequent rapid growth and its role in the 
institutionalization of political activity. Historical attention has 
also tended to centre, not unnaturally, on the prominent founders of 
the AWA, Theodore and McCormack, since it was their able leadership of 
the union which initiated their careers as principals of the labour 
movement in Queensland. 
However, this paper is confined to aspects of mining unionism 
not fully treated by previous research: it discusses in detail the 
formative years of the AWA in the mining hinterland of far North 
Queensland. It was the experience of the AWA in these years (1907-1910) 
which moulded the union's later concept of Industrial relations; which 
demonstrated the value of a highly-centralized mass union of general 
workers as opposed to unions confined to a single industry or occupation; 
and which first impressed upon the union's leaders the necessity of 
politics as an integral function of trade unionism. Finally, this paper 
offers a re-interpretation of the alleged radicalism of the AWA. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century mining operations in 
the Walsh and Tinaroo district recovered after a long slump and began 
to expand. Improved transport and communications and a rise in 
industrial metal prices on the world market presaged a dramatic boom in 
the district's copper, silver-lead, tin and wolfram mines. With an 
influx of southern and overseas capital, employment opportunities 
expanded, attracting labour from all parts of the country. Established 
towns such as Irvinebank and Herberton assumed a look of renewed 
prosperity; crude unsophisticated mining settlements like Chillagoe, 
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Mungana, O.K., Mt. Molloy and Smith's Creek were reinvigorated. 
Stimulated by the high prices, new mines were established, abandoned 
mines re-opened, and existing mines developed more thoroughly. New 
machinery was installed, communications improved, smelting works built; 
the share market soared. In his report for 1906 the local mining warden 
claimed that: 
Never has the district gone through a more 
prosperous and progressive year than the 
one under review. Of course, the high price 
of minerals has no doubt created the incentive 
to prospect, and, as it is a district of such 
vast and rich resources, the miner and the 
capitalist feel justified in giving their 
labour and money with every possibility of 
a satisfactory return for their outlay.2 
A feature of the Walsh and Tinaroo mineral field was the 
co-existence of individual alluvial prospectors and miners with large-
scale company concerns employing hundreds of wage earners. In 1906-1907 
over one thousand men won an independent living from alluvial tin and 
wolfram; mining and construction companies employed a further four and 
a half thousand workers. As surplus labour was attracted from less 
prosperous areas, however, a number of unskilled workers found 
themselves unemployed. Independent prospectors also sought employment 
intermittently when short of money or supplies thereby swelling the 
labour force. The large companies thus had a fairly rapid turnover of 
employees. Men periodically left their jobs to work claims on their 
own account, or moved to the coast in winter and spring, seeking 
3 
emplojnnent in the canefields and sugar mills. 
In the buoyant mood of 1906 and early 1907 the mining warden 
discerned in the settlement of Chillagoe "a more prosperous and 
4 
contented feeling among the community...a feeling of permanency". 
Most other observers gained an exactly opposite impression: the mining 
towns were bawdy, brawling places that "still had a raw edge of 
impermanency about them". Amenities were few, women scarce and living 
conditions crude in these isolated communities. The principal 
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recreations were drinking and gambling. Working conditions above ground 
were poor; below they were unhealthy and often dangerous. Dust, damp, 
outbreaks of fire and earth slides were constant hazards. Lung disease 
was a common ailment. Long hours and only moderate wages with which to 
purchase highly-priced goods compounded the grievances of employees and 
marred industrial relations. 
Despite these grievances, initial attempts to form unions 
failed in the face of worker apathy and employer resistance. Most such 
efforts were unco-ordinated and confined to particular worksites. 
Moreover, many wage earners worked for short periods simply to finance 
their own small claims; they showed scant interest in Improving 
conditions. Thus in April and May 1907 a series of sporadic, poorly 
organized strikes by employees of the large Vulcan tin mine at 
Irvinebank failed. As Young says: 
Attempts had been made to organise the workers, 
but rugged individualism, a capacity for 
endurance, frequent movement of people, and, 
above all, a lack of knowledge about trade 
union techniques made corporate action 
difficult.7 
In the second half of 1907 there was a sudden and severe fall 
in the price of industrial metals. The world copper market. Inflated 
by over-trading, was struck by financial panic: prices tumbled from 
£112 per ton in March to £98 in June and £62 in December 1907. Silver-
lead and tin prices fell simultaneously: lead from £22 per ton in 
January to £14 in December 1907; tin from £190 to £120 per ton in the 
o 
same period. Few of the smaller mines survived the fall; large 
companies were forced to restrict their operations. The bleak mood at 
the end of 1907 contrasted strikingly with that at the beginning of the 
year: "...the enthusiasm which exalted every copper-stained rock to 
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Most of the mines that survived now concentrated on 
development work and repair of roads and railways in readiness for a 
hoped-for market revival. The ranks of retrenched employees swelled 
as prospectors and small-scale miners abandoned claims and leases which 
were no longer payable. Rising discontent among workers increased as 
employers attempted to cut costs by reducing wages, increasing hours 
and generally tightening up on disciplinary conditions. 
Although the miners and labourers of the far North were slow 
to take action to secure wage rises or imprpvements in working 
conditions, they were more ready to resist moves to lower existing 
standards. Indeed it was in the adversity of the 1907 slump that a 
threat to labour standards created favourable conditions - paradoxically 
it would seem - for the birth of trade unionism. Some workers at 
Herberton asked the AWU and ALF to send an organizer to the North. 
A more positive attitude was adopted by a group of Irvinebank workers 
who in September 1907 launched the Amalgamated Workers' Association. 
Similar action was soon taken at Mungana and O.K., where employees 
formed a Miners' Smelters' and General Workers' Union. 
The leading activists in the new trade union were Ted Theodore 
and William McCormack. Theodore was recently arrived from Broken Hill 
where he had worked for over four years, thus acquiring a knowledge of 
trade union activity. An energetic, large and pugnacious young man of 
twenty-three years in 1907, he was an avid student of socialist and 
economic literature. McCormack was twenty-eight years old, a gregarious 
character with a strapping physique. He was employed at Stannary Hills, 
having arrived on the field from Mt. Morgan in 1904. Theodore's 
brilliance and organizing genius coupled with McCormack's administrative 
ability, energy and capacity for sheer^hard work, transformed a small, 
local union of miners and labourers into the most powerful trade union 
in the state. 
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The AWA began as a defensive organization. It was formed to 
combat the hardening attitude of mining companies hit by falling world 
mineral prices. However, there is little that is particularly novel 
about the birth of a trade union in a period of declining industrial 
prosperity - especially if, as in 1907, other Industries and the economy 
generally are on the upturn. Many unions came into existence, as the 
AWA did, originally as defensive associations, to preserve an already 
existing standard: 
Fear of a fall in the standard of living has 
always been the strength of labour agitation. 
The cautious man who will take no risk to add 
to his wages will fight the hardest to 
maintain them.12 
The outstanding feature of the AWA derived not from the 
circumstances in which it emerged but from its subsequent success in 
operation, often in the face of adverse circumstances. This success 
was mainly due to the drive and ambition of its leaders. Under the 
guidance of Theodore and McCormack the union expanded rapidly. Branches 
were soon established at Stannary Hills, Smith's Creek and Herberton. 
In December 1907 it affiliated with the ALF. "The Irvinebank Amalgamated 
Workers' Union Csic]", commented the Worker, "is becoming a real live 
organisation under the guidance of an energetic committee and 
13 
executive". In February 1908 the AWA strengthened these links with 
the mainstream of labour organization in Queensland by sending 
representatives to the ALF Provincial Council meeting in Brisbane - the 
14 
only northern union to do so. 
In April 1908 Theodore and McCormack initiated a conference 
at Irvinebank to amalgamate the various AWA branches with the O.K. and 
Mungana Miners' Smelters' and General Workers' Union. Theodore's 
report of the conference Indicated that the AWA had wide and 
far-reaching alms. The purpose of the conference was: 
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to found a scheme for the complete amalgamation 
of all existing unions in the north, under one 
constitution and one controlling body, and for 
the purpose of propounding a system for the 
better organisation of the workers of northern 
Queensland generally.15 
Hitherto, the various AWA branches had remained autonomous 
local organizations; now, together with the O.K. and Mungana unionists, 
they were brought under the control of a central executive which met 
regularly at Irvinebank. The AWA now had 600 members. Theodore was 
appointed to the only full-time paid office of general organizer, while 
16 
W.F. Lobban became general secretary. Shortly afterwards, Lobban 
resigned, fearing victimization by the Irvinebank company for his union 
activities. McCormack, previously vice-president, replaced him, and 
the executive headquarters were moved to Stannary Hills. 
One of the first steps taken by the modified AWA was to 
affiliate directly with the Labor Party; it also asked the CPE to 
recognize the union as "the leading Political Labor Body" in the local 
18 
Woothakata electorate. The move was of dual significance: it 
indicated that the AWA looked upon politics as a legitimate and 
necessary sphere of trade union activity; it also signalled the 
intention of the AWA leaders to play an active role in politics. By 
securing CPE recognition as the electorate's "leading" branch, or head 
centre, the AWA hoped to confirm its dominance over the existing Labor 
electoral centre, the Herberton Socialist League CHSL]. On this 
occasion the CPE refused to comply with the AWA's request, instructing 
McCormack to "communicate with the registered organisation at 
Herberton", but the AWA ultimately replaced the HSL as Woothakata head 
19 
centre in September 1909. 
Shortly after the April 1908 conference the AWA was involved 
in its first major industrial dispute - a strike of construction workers
employed on the Etheridge railway. The AWA's entry into the dispute 
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served further notice that Theodore and McCormack planned to foster a 
mass union of general labourers, not merely a parochial miners' union. 
Under the Etheridge Railway Act, the private railway from 
Almaden to the Etheridge mineral field was being privately constructed 
by the Chillagoe Company. Trouble amongst employees had been simmering 
for some months before Theodore visited the navvies' camps in July 1908. 
Grievances centred upon the company's continued refusal to comply 
with one of the conditions of the Act, namely, to pay the ruling rate 
of wages in the district. The workers claimed 9/- per day as the 
20 
minimum rate, but the company paid no more than 8/- per day. 
Taking advantage of the discontent on the line, Theodore 
enrolled the workers in the AWA and secured his executive's approval for 
21 
a cessation of work. Three hundred and fifty navvies formed strike 
camps, which were maintained by compulsory levies on union members 
unaffected by the dispute. In addition, the financial and moral support 
of the ALF was sought; it was willingly given, and the strike fund 
22 
swelled by donations from many trade unions. ALF organizer Charles 
Collins visited the trouble spot and reported favourably on the AWA and 
23 its conduct of the strike. Regular lengthy reports to the Worker 
maintained the continued interest and support of all Queensland unionists 
in what was widely seen as a crucial struggle for a fair wage: 
The conditions which have been foisted upon the 
men right through the construction of the line 
have been worse than rotten, the men having to 
submit to the most arbitrary rule on the part 
of despotic supervisors, and in almost all 
cases having to work more than the recognised 
eight hours....The sanitation of camps has 
been bad - scores of men have died on this 
line, some of the camps being veritable 
fever beds.24 
After several weeks the strike had reached a stalemate: the 
men remained firm in their demand for a minimum 9/- per day; the company 
was equally as firm in refusing the claim. At* this stage Theodore's 
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earlier tactics in gaining the support of the wider Queensland labour 
movement paid off: Labor parliamentarians and ALF officials waited 
upon the secretary for railways, a conference was arranged between the 
25 disputing parties, and on 25 September 1908 the Chillagoe Company 
gave way, granting the 9/- and other concessions to the Etheridge 
navvies. The important role played by the ALF and Labor parliamentarians 
in resolving the dispute was demonstrated when not only Theodore but 
also ALF secretary Hinchcliffe and PLP leader Bowman signed the 
26 
agreement on behalf of the AWA. 
Nevertheless, much of the credit for the successful conduct 
of the Etheridge railway strike was clearly due to Theodore, whose 
organizing ability and foresight in establishing contacts with Brisbane-
based labour leaders eventually won the day for the AWA. The solidarity 
and discipline of the striking navvies was maintained rigorously: 
"...during the whole period of the dispute there was not a backslider 
among them - every man stood solid as a rock, and the united front they 
27 presented was Impregnable." 
Two other factors also had considerable bearing on the outcome 
of the strike. First, the navvies seemed to have the support of a 
28 large section of the general public. Second, some members of the 
Kidston government, including the secretary for railways, George Kerr, 
were concerned at the Chillagoe Company's evasion of a clause of the 
Etheridge Railway Act. Indeed, it was Kerr who persuaded the company to 
meet the union and who was therefore partly responsible for the final 
29 
settlement of the dispute. With public opinion and sections of the 
government at least tacitly in support of the strikers' cause (if not 
of their action), it was not surprising that the company capitulated. 
Victory in the Etheridge railway strike demonstrated the value 
of a composite general labourers' union, encompassing all classes of 
wage earners in a variety of industries. Alone, the navvies would very 
likely have been defeated, but with the backing of the AWA miners and 
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their fellow ALF affiliates, they were remarkably successful. The 
strike confirmed the AWA as an effective industrial union capable of 
protecting its members. According to Theodore, defeat would have meant 
30 
"a severe set-back to unionism in the North." Success, on the other 
hand, gave a great impetus to the spread of unionism generally in North 
Queensland. One of the first tangible effects was that navvies on the 
Atherton to Herberton line also sought AWA membership and demanded 
31 higher wages. 
The Etheridge strike thus encouraged other northern workers 
to join the AWA which grew rapidly in strength. New branches were 
established at all mining settlements and railway camps in the district, 
though methods of organization were still rough and ready. Recruiting 
procedures, for example, bordered on impressment, while those who 
neglected the discipline of the AWA incurred as much opprobrium as those 
who refused to join. Theodore reported shortly after the Etheridge 
strike that "some scabs sought exoneration from the strike committee." 
They received short shrift from the AWA: 
It was decided in each case that the culprit 
was guilty of an unpardonable offence against 
their fellow workers, and they were left to the 
fate of Inexorable public scorn. The feeling 
shown towards these misguided men amounts to 
almost unutterable contempt.32 
At the end of 1907, before the Etheridge strike, the AWA had 
196 members and £61 in the bank. Twelve months later, by dint of astute 
organization and efficient administration, it had 1348. Finances were 
still shaky after the costly three-month long Etheridge strike but stood 
33 
at an Improved £394. 
On 10 February 1909 delegates from eleven branches met in 
Chillagoe for the first annual AWA conference, the main purpose of 
which was to ratify the draft constitution and rules of the union. The 
conference confirmed the existing highly centralized executive control; 
a significant feature was the decision to pay the general secretary a 
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full-time salary of £200 per annum, placing the office "beyond the pale 
34 
of interference of victimising mine managers". As well, all effective 
authority was vested in the executive committee, which in practice gave 
control of the union to the two paid officials - the general organizer 
(Theodore) and the general secretary (McCormack). At the same time the 
union headquarters were removed to Chillagoe. 
The alms and objectives of the AWA, as expressed in the 
constitution and rules adopted by the 1909 conference, were concerned 
largely with working conditions, that is, with the immediate economic 
concerns and sectional Interests of the members. The "fighting platform" 
stated simply: 
1. Advocacy of a Minimum Wage in North Queensland. 
2. Advocacy of a 44 hour week in the Mines. 
3. Advocacy of State control of the Conditions of 
Emplo3rment in all Industries. 
4. Abolition of all forms of Alien Labour. 
5. Better Inspection of Mines. 
6. Official Recognition of the Union by 
Employers.35 
Here, obviously, was a moderate and practical program, 
eschewing reference to any form of socialist ideology. Yet in its 
over-riding concern with economic conditions, the conference did not 
disavow the AWA's expressly political aspirations. On the contrary, 
the constitution called for union representation on municipal bodies 
and required the AWA to conduct plebiscites in conjunction with local 
WPOs "for the selection of parliamentary candidates to run in the 
36 interests of Labour." 
The AWA therefore aligned Itself with orthodox Labor Party 
politics in Queensland. The union's leaders saw industrial strength as 
the basis for political success; conversely, political Influence exerted 
by trade unions was to be the basis of industrial gains. Industrial 
action and political action were seen as complementary methods of 
improving wage earners' conditions. In pursuit of this policy both 
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Theodore and McCormack eventually entered state parliament; both became 
cabinet ministers and ultimately premiers of Queensland. The policy of 
union involvement in politics became an entrenched tradition after the 
AWA merged with the AWU in 1913. Thereafter, the AWU dominated both 
the industrial and political wings of the labour movement in North 
Queensland. 
As with organized labour elsewhere in Australia, AWA members 
opposed non-white labour. Indeed, agitation against the employment of 
aliens was often the first form of collective action that unionists 
took.^  In September 1907 hotel owners at O.K. yielded to local workers' 
demands that they dismiss their Asian cooks. The victory was seen as 
both an industrial and a racial one: "The yellow cook was paid at the 
37 
rate of £2.10s per week, but white cooks now get £4." In March 1908 
angry public meetings at Mungana persuaded two publicans to dismiss 
their Japanese and Chinese employees, while a few months later the 
Herberton AWA branch became concerned about the feared "Invasion" of 
"hundreds of Hindoos." In January 1909 the Chillagoe AWA branch 
38 boycotted hotels employing non-white domestic staff. 
Unionists in the far north seemed united in their racialism, 
but some dissension arose at the AWA 1909 conference over the exact 
delineation of a colour line: some branches had admitted Syrians as 
members while others had rejected them. Unable to resolve this issue 
after a lively discussion, conference decided to leave the matter in 
39 the hands of the various branches. 
The conference also considered the propensity of many mine 
employees to travel to the coast seeking work during the cane harvest 
season; it called for consultation with the ASWU with a view to 
including the sugar district of Mossman in the AWA's organizing area. 
In the event, the union did not directly organize sugar workers until 
1911, but by enrolling miners, engineers, railway navvies and 
construction labourers, it was already well on the way to becoming a 
m 
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mass union of general workers. Through efficient management, it 
commanded a high degree of loyalty from its members; in return, it 
offered effective protection of their welfare. The competence of the 
AWA as an industrial organization was soon to be tried and tested on a 
number of occasions as it fought to secure and maintain two of its main 
objectives: a 44-hour week in mines and recognition of the union by 
employers. In fact, at the very time that the union delegates were 
meeting in conference, the AWA was involved in an acrimonious dispute 
with the managements of the Irvinebank and Stannary Hills tin mines. 
The metalliferous mining industry elsewhere in Australia was 
hindered by Industrial disputes at this time; the most important 
culminated in a lengthy strike at Broken Hill early in 1909. Owing to 
the low prices of silver and lead, and the depletion of the more 
economically accessible high grade ore, Broken Hill Proprietary [BHP], 
the largest employer on the field, reduced wages by some 13 per cent. 
The miners' union's resistance to this decision precipitated a bitter 
41 
and violent four-month strike. 
Industrial turmoil in the Chillagoe and Herberton mining 
region occurred in somewhat similar circumstances to those at Broken 
Hill. After the metal prices slump in late 1907, companies 
concentrated on the development of ore reserves, the installation of 
more efficient machinery and the Improvement of transport facilities 
with a view to the more economical extraction and treatment of mineral 
ores. In succeeding years, the problem of continued low prices was 
aggravated by the depletion of local ore bodies. Management responded 
by economizing on production costs, which to employees might mean 
retrenchment, longer hours or reduced wages. Having regard to the 
collective strength of the workers now organized in the AWA, such 
cost-cutting moves were calculated to cause discontent and provoke 
confrontation. 
In November 1908 a conference of mine managers met in 
Chillagoe to draw up a common industrial policy for the district. The 
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meeting resolved that from 1 January 1909 the rates of wages and hours 
of labour current at Chillagoe should be adopted by all mines in the 
42 district. Since the wages paid at Chillagoe were considerably lower 
than elsewhere, and since Chillagoe worked 48 hours while other mines 
worked 44 hours, the employers' action represented a concerted and 
direct attack on the workers' organization. To survive as an effective 
trade union, the AWA had to resist this attack militantly: 
The hour is coming when we must prove our 
manhood by decisive and courageous action. 
Our interests are seriously imperilled by 
non-descript mineowners of North Queensland, 
and we must recognise that all who are not 
with us are against us.^3 
Early in December 1908 the AWA notified the Irvinebank Tin 
Company and the Stannary Hills Mines and Tramway Company that their 
employees refused to accept the proposed new terms, which amounted to 
a 15 per cent wage reduction and an increase in working hours from 44 
to 48. The AWA suggested a conference with the employers, expressing 
its willingness to negotiate an agreement. However, the companies 
refused to acknowledge the existence of the union and Ignored its 
approach, whereupon the union prepared for the struggle. Theodore and 
McCormack visited Stannary Hills and Irvinebank in mid-December to 
44 
marshal the workers and improve union organization. 
On New Year's Day 1909 miners at Stannary Hills stopped work 
to protest at the wage cuts and increased hours. The strike soon spread 
to the Vulcan tin mine at Irvinebank and later to the rare metal mines 
at Wolfram Camp and Bamford. Union solidarity was enhanced when the 
enginedrlvers and carpenters employed at the mines also ceased work in 
sympathy with the striking miners. The AWA announced that it was 
prepared to meet the management in conference at any time, or to submit 
the matter to an independent arbitrator; the employers, however, refused 
to acknowledge even the union's right to represent the employees. 
According to the manager of the Stannary Hills company: 
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...the majority of miners have been urged 
against their will to make trouble, and have 
gone out at the bidding of men, who, unlike 
the worker, have nothing to lose but receive 
fat salaries to stir up strife and discontent ,, 
and bring more sorrows to the home of the worker. 
Incensed at the companies' outright rejection of their 
overtures, the AWA angrily denied such claims. Hostility between 
management and labour intensified. Indeed, McCormack's bellicosity now 
seemed to eclipse the AWA's professed wish to settle the matter by 
peaceful negotiation: 
The intolerance of our opponents, their 
arrogant attitude towards our pacific 
proposals and ill-dissembled hostility to 
our right to combine has necessitated a 
reckoning at the point of the industrial 
bayonet....In order to convince [the mine 
owners] and their servile janissaries 
that despotic ukase and arbitrary fiat in 
the industrial affairs of a free community 
are only incantations of impotence - we 
must carry the fight into the enemies' camp 
and turn their own guns against them.^7 
The strike was well organized. Levies were struck on AWA 
members; donations were solicited from other trade unions; the service 
of ALF organizer Collins were secured to aid in the on-the-spot conduct 
of the strike. In order to supplement strike relief, strikers were 
48 
organized into union-subsidized prospecting parties. 
After four weeks, the AWA reiterated its proposal that the 
dispute be submitted to the arbitrament of a district or supreme court 
judge. Again the companies refused, provoking predictable response 
from the union: 
The olive branch of peaceful arbitration 
offered by the miners has therefore been 
scornfully rejected, reason has been set 
aside, and the exploiting bosses of 
Capitalism have determined, if possible, 
to enforce their despotic will.^9 
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The strike continued and the workers showed little sign of 
surrender. At length, however, as the tin mines remained idle, the 
Stannary Hills company recognized the union and agreed to submit the 
dispute to an arbitrator. Initial negotiations proved abortive since 
the parties could not agree on the question of working hours, but 
finally on 1 April 1909 the Stannary Hills workers accepted new 
proposals offered by the management: slight wage increases were 
awarded to all hands; the working week was increased from 44 to 48 
hours; the company was to pay the AWA's legal expenses at arbitration; 
no striking unionists were to be victimized. A similar settlement was 
, , ., . ^ , 50 
also reached at Irvinebank. 
Thus, as in most industrial disputes, the strike settlement 
involved compromise. An important gain for the AWA was the mere fact 
of its recognition by employers. The increase in wages, when the 
companies had hoped for wage reductions, was also a substantial 
concession. The Stannary Hills Mines and Tramway Company was successful 
in having working hours increased, but this proved a Pyrrhic victory: 
two months after the lockout ended, the company was wound up; a new 
company was formed to carry on mining operations in the area. 
Naturally, the suspension of company operations tempered any feelings 
of triumph amongst the employees. The unemployment level in the 
district, already high before the strike, was adversely affected by the 
three-month long lockout. Further, the Ivanhoe mine, the largest in the 
district, remained idle until January 1910, having been flooded along 
with many other mines when the enginedrlvers manning the pumps withdrew 
52 their labour in the previous January. 
The disruption caused by the strike aroused disaffection 
amongst union members, many of whom did not regain their jobs. Some 
workers criticized the AWA for provoking the dispute; others attacked 
the union executive for its surrender of the 44-hour week. To the first 
charge, McCormack replied that the AWA had not sought the dispute but 
rather had been forced into it by the companies' aggressive action; to 
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the second, McCormack argued that in view of the unfavourable economic 
conditions and high local unemployment, the AWA had obtained "a very 
53 fair compromise". To most AWA men this probably seemed a reasonable 
assessment; certainly, any disquiet was quelled by the powerful 
executive and by more obvious success in other industrial conflicts. 
Throughout 1909 and early 1910 industrial trouble flared at 
the wolfram, bismuth and molybdenite mines at Wolfram Camp and Bamford. 
The issues in this lingering dispute were the same as formerly: the 
union's determination to maintain a 44-hour week and the employers' 
refusal to recognize the union's existence. This time, however, the 
AWA's bargaining position was even stronger: the high prices ruling for 
rare metals enabled the striking workers to prospect profitably on their 
own account. Finally, in February 1910, the union's demands were 
conceded. 
In July 1909 AWA unionists at Mungana struck work in support 
of an enginedrlvers' demand for a pay increase. The Mungana mines -
Lady Jane and Glrofla - had perhaps the most oppressive and dangerous 
working conditions in the district; discontent there had simmered for 
months before finally erupting in the enginedrlvers' strike. After only 
one week the company capitulated, granting increased wages not only to 
enginedrlvers but to all underground hands as well. 
These successes for the AWA, however, were attended by 
setbacks at the Big Reef mine on the Etheridge field, and at the O.K. 
copper mine. At Big Reef, a Chillagoe Company operation, employees 
went on strike in early August 1909 in opposition to an increase in 
their working week from 44 to 47 hours. Big Reef was a fairly small, 
isolated mine, where union organization was vulnerable; the company 
consequently had little trouble in persuading many workers to return to 
work under the new conditions. The AWA could no nothing to resolve the 
issue: months later few Big Reef miners were unionists and the 47-hour 
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week remained in force. 
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The union suffered more significant defeat at O.K., where the 
decline in metal prices had affected the copper mines and smelters more 
severely than elsewhere in the district. Although the mine - opened 
only in 1902 - paid high dividends in 1905, 1906 and 1907, the company 
directors had installed outmoded and inefficient smelting equipment; 
they had also neglected to provide a light railway to the railhead at 
Mungana. (Camels, and subsequently traction engines, carried ore and 
supplies between the two centres.) 
In October 1909 the O.K. management reduced the number of men 
working each shift in the smelters, promising, however, to provide 
alternative work for those who lost their jobs. A general meeting of 
the local AWA branch decided to oppose this decision, and all work at 
the mines and smelters stopped. The traction engine drivers also 
joined the strike. Somewhat reluctantly, the AWA executive at 
Chillagoe endorsed the strike, but appeared less than sanguine of 
success: "...as the O.K. members were unanimous in the action taken 
they could not do otherwise than sanction the affair; and do their best 
58 to uphold them in their difficulty." 
McCormack's misgivings about entering the dispute were 
quickly confirmed when he visited O.K. and found that the local union 
leaders had acted rashly. The, apparent solidarity of the men had been 
dissipated: "The great majority of the men seemed to CbeH of an 
opinion that the trouble was uncalled for." McCormack told the AWA 
executive that the union had a poor case: "The issue seemed to be too 
small for such extreme measures." The executive concurred, blaming the 
59 O.K. branch officers for "an unfortunate mistake" - the more 
unfortunate, so it appeared to some - when the O.K. company could use 
the dispute as a means of closing down the now unprofitable works 
without alienating public sympathy. 
At first sight, the settlement of the O.K. strike after five 
weeks seemed a reasonable result. The original cause of the strike - a 
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reduction in the number of men in shifts - remained, but the company 
conceded slight wage increases for work in wet ground and for machine 
operators. The management also agreed not to victimize any striker; 
it further guaranteed the existing pay rates and the 44-hour week 
underground. Despite any private misgivings he may have had, Theodore 
publicly defended the settlement: "The men actually had materially 
bettered their status by making a stand against the constant irritating 
encroachments upon their conditions." 
Any satisfaction gained proved transitory, however, when the 
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O.K. mine and smelters indeed remained closed until late January 1910. 
The continuing unemployment prolonged disaffection among the AWA rank 
and file, much of it now directed against the union executive. 
McCormack defended himself by reiterating that the O.K. men had 
blundered: the executive had had no option but to sanction the dispute 
since the branch had decided to strike by ballot. McCormack's 
recriminations and his personal abuse of the O.K. branch members 
aroused considerable emnity, contributing to his defeat in the election 
for general secretary in January 1910. A few months later, however, he 
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was re-appointed to the position. 
Industrial setbacks such as that at O.K. were eclipsed by the 
AWA's political success. From the outset the AWA had organized for 
political ends as well as Industrial action. It therefore came as no 
surprise when the union's general organizer was nominated as the 
official Labor candidate for the local Woothakata electorate. The 
Worker applauded Theodore's candidature: "Brainy, sober and straight, 
he is the man best fitted to represent a mining constituency like 
Woothakata."^^ 
Since 1902 the electorate had been held by Mick Woods, a 
former Chillagoe railway enginedriver who had defected from the Labor 
Party with Kidston in 1907. He retained the seat at state elections in 
1907 and 1908, easily defeating the Labor candidate, Alf Pain, a 
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Herberton miner, who was also president and secretary of the Herberton 
Socialist League. As the name implied, the HSL held more radical views 
than the AWA leaders, in 1909 espousing the syndicalist tenets of the 
Industrial Workers of the World [iWW]. The HSL offered some challenge 
to AWA dominance of Labor politics in the district; while Pain was 
secretary of the Herberton branch of the AWA, it continually criticized 
the executive, demanding more rank and file control of the union. 
Outside Herberton, support for the HSL was insubstantial. 
The great majority of miners, navvies and labourers of the far north 
were more attuned to the pragmatic reformism of Theodore and McCormack. 
It was only a short time before the AWA demolished this challenge to 
their authority. Pain was easily defeated in his bid for the position 
of general organizer in December 1909; his influence in the union was 
completely destroyed in 1910 when the annual AWA conference censured 
him for making allegations of mismanagement against McCormack. Most 
AWA members agreed with A.E. Church of Chillagoe: 
I sum up this Herberton so-called IWW-ism as 
bombastic, unpractical, foreign and unsuitable 
to Australian sentiment and conditions, and 
conducive to political sectarianism.68 
On 2 October 1909 Theodore narrowly won Woothakata by a margin 
of 91 votes. His victory vindicated the belief of both the AWA and 
the ALF that strong union organization would foster political success. 
The ALF secretary had earlier predicted that "the practical evidence of 
a unlonistic revival all over the State...must be assuredly followed by 
a much healthier political atmosphere." 
Theodore's election enabled him to increase the influence of 
the AWA in the Queensland labour movement. The AWA was now attracting 
much attention and respect for the obvious ability of its officials, its 
organizing success and its active policy in industrial disputes. This 
was demonstrated in February 1910 when Theodore was elected vice-president 
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of the ALF, and in May 1910 when McCormack was elected to the Central 
72 Political Executive of the Queensland Labor Party. The activities of 
the AWA delegates at the trade union congresses of 1910 and 1911 further 
73 
contributed to the growing esteem in which the AWA was held. 
More remarkable in the union's ascendency was the fact that 
in 1909 there were fewer miners employed on the Chillagoe and Herberton 
mineral fields than in any year since 1902. Employment opportunities 
picked up slightly in 1910, but it was obvious that the days of heady 
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optimism and high profits had gone from the district for good. 
Despite these adverse circumstances the AWA continued to expand, partly 
because of the enrolment of railway construction workers as far south 
as Proserpine. Union membership stood at 1650 in December 1909, 
compared with 1348 a year previously. By December 1910 the AWA boasted 
2300 members. 
Industrial trouble continued in 1910. The Lady Jane mine at 
Mungana closed after a subsidence and a serious underground fire; at 
Glrofla the high-grade ore had been exhausted, and the diminishing 
profitability of the low-grade lodes did not augur well for future 
mining operations; the Mt. Molloy copper mines and smelters closed down 
permanently in 1909; the O.K. works, which had resumed early in 1910, 
also ceased operations later that year. A rise in the price of tin in 
1910 was offset by the exhaustion of many payable lodes, leading to the 
closure of tin mines at Smith's Creek, Stannary Hills and Herberton. 
On the other hand, the price of wolfram remained high, giving some 
encouragement to large companies as well as small-scale miners. The 
completion of the Chillagoe company's railway to Charleston also saw the 
revival of many auriferous copper mines on the Etheridge field. 
Despite the overall bleak prospects for the mining industry, 
the AWA persevered in its determination to expand its activities and 
protect the welfare of its members. Since "employers could not afford 
to be generous, even had they so wished," disputes between management 
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and labour continued, often Involving the union's longstanding antagonist 
- the Chillagoe Company. 
AWA unionists at Charleston stopped work in February 1910 in 
protest at the Chillagoe Company's decision to increase working hours 
at their recently acquired Queenslander and Nil Desperandum mines from 
78 44 to 48 hours per week. The company gave way. Even the government 
was confronted by the industrial muscle of the AWA: in June, 
construction navvies on the Herberton to Ravenshoe railway went on 
strike for a rise in the minimum wage rate. The AWA organizer, Fred 
Martyn, attributed their victory to "the splendid class of workers" 
79 
employed, "95 per cent of whom are AWA members". But Martyn 
overlooked the very vital support given by local residents who, anxious 
for the railway to be completed, called a series of successful public 
meetings, angrily blaming the government for the delay in construction 
80 
and urging it to accede to the navvies' "reasonable request." The 
AWA's next test came at Koorboora, arising out of its efforts to enrol 
mine workers. The mine manager dismissed some employees who joined 
the union, whereupon all workers downed tools. Management promptly 
capitulated and recognized the union. A brief strike over wage cuts at 
81 Charleston met with similar success. 
By now - late 1910 - the Worker habitually referred to the far 
northern union as "the fighting AWA", a sobriquet bestowed out of 
deference to its organizing zeal and its readiness to use direct action 
82 
to further its objectives. The title was well-earned since the AWA 
was prepared to resort to direct action, but not in any syndicalist 
pursuit of ideological goals. The militancy of the AWA was most often 
defensive - a reaction against the belligerent attitude of mining 
employers who refused to negotiate with the union or even to recognize 
it as its members' advocate. In the depressed market conditions of the 
base metal industry in far North Queensland, a trade union's adherence 
to a policy of protecting labour standards meant that it would be 
involved in strikes while northern employers consistently refused to 
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grant reforms and in fact tried to lower the existing standards of 
working conditions. 
The characteristic prelude to trade union militancy on 
Australian metal-mining fields was a price slump, as Blainey correctly 
argues: 
So long as a copper or lead field was new 
or the price of its metals high, there was 
small danger of a sharp rift between owners 
and men. But once workers' capitalism 
declined and metal prices fell, tensions 
quickly marred personal relations. As 
Broken Hill revealed, the economics of 
base-metal fields were such that workers' 
capitalism tended to decline more quickly 
than on a goldfield. Moreover, unlike gold, 
the price of which was fixed, base-metals on 
the world market behaved erratically, and 
thus a sudden fall in price imposed sudden 
tensions on the mining fields. When companies 
suffered a drastic fall in profits they tried 
to cut wages or exact more work from men. 
The men resisted the attack.83 
Thus most of the early strikes in which the AWA became 
involved were the result of employers' attempts to cut wages or to altei 
working conditions. Its frequent recourse to strike action was also 
influenced by three other factors: its determination to survive as an 
industrial union; the employers' adamant refusal to recognise the 
union until forced to do so; the legal situation in Queensland at the 
time, which as yet did not provide for an alternative system of 
arbitration. 
Further, a problem which the mining settlements of Herberton 
and Chillagoe had in common with metal-mining towns the world over, may 
also be relevant: isolated communities dominated by, and dependent for 
their livelihood on, a single employer, and with a restless, 
predominantly unmarried workforce, have historically engendered tough 
oc 
industrial relations. However, the AWA generally explored every 
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' avenue of negotiation before authorizing a stoppage of work. McCormack 
stressed as much at the time of the Stannary Hills lockout: 
...it will be noted that the Executive made 
every effort to bring about a conference 
between the mine managers and our members who 
are affected, and that they took the extreme 
step of calling out the members only when all 
means of bringing about a peaceable adjustment 
of the difficulty had been exhausted.86 
Such tactics were the guiding principles behind the AWA's 
conduct of industrial relations. On occasions when the union rank and 
file hastily precipitated strikes - for instance at O.K. and later at 
Selwyn - the executive publicly endorsed the dispute but privately 
rebuked the local officials for causing "unnecessary loss of time and 
87 
money to members." Shortly after the AWA merged with other North 
Queensland unions in December 1910, McCormack complained about the 
number of small strikes occurring in Townsville. He advised the union 
district secretary to intervene in disputes before the men actually 
ceased work: there would then be a better chance of successful 
88 
settlement without a strike. 
Often, when the AWA entered a dispute, it was partly with the 
object of gaining more members and thereby more industrial strength. 
Conversely, as union action prpved successful in maintaining or 
improving working conditions and wages, it attracted more workers into 
its ranks. McCormack reasoned: "nothing is gained by ignoring a 
89 dispute and it helps us in the organising." 
As employers came to recognise the AWA and negotiate with it, 
so the union used the strike weapon less frequently. It is noteworthy 
that in J910 most of the industrial conflict in which the AWA was 
involved, occurred on the Etheridge field or at Koorboora - areas where 
the union had not hitherto been active. On the other hand, its major 
achievement in the Chillagoe-Herberton district - a negotiated Increase 
in the minimum wage at the Chillagoe smelters from 8/- to 9/- per day. 
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without any withdrawal of labour - occurred in an area where the AWA was 
90 
well established. In 1913 Theodore lauded the fact that employers 
were now more willing to negotiate with the AWA: 
It is a favourable commentary on the work of 
the union that the employers adopt a much 
less bellicose attitude now than formerly, 
and are more ready to meet the representatives 
of the union in peaceful confab to discuss 
matters of mutual concern.^1 
As the AWA's use of direct action aimed primarily at achieving 
recognition and negotiation, so it never opposed an ancillary means to 
the same end: contrary to what its record might suggest, the AWA ' 
preferred some form of arbitration to direct action. In fact, Theodore's 
very first speech in parliament advocated an Arbitration Act: 
There have been so many disputes in 
connection with railway construction and 
with the mining and sugar industries 
during the past two years that I think 
it incumbent upon the Government to make 
some provision against the dislocation of 
industry brought by such disputes....The 
dispute which took place at Stannary Hills 
this year could have been avoided had there 
been provision for arbitration.92 
On occasions Theodore and McCormack appeared to condemn 
arbitration, but, as Kennedy discerned, their criticism was largely 
aimed at specific features of Queensland or Commonwealth legislation, 
not at the principle of arbitration per se. Thus at the AWA conference 
of January 1913 McCormack stated that: "Personally he did not believe 
in arbitration, because it was fictitious. Judge Higgins had laid down 
93 
a very beautiful sentiment until one came to look at it." Previously, 
however, McCormack had admitted the benefits of arbitration: if forced 
the disputing parties to come together, and gave the workers an 
94 
opportunity to air their grievances. Indeed, although McCormack 
professed a lack of "belief" in arbitration at the 1913 conference - a 
sentiment echoed by other prominent AWA officials present - this did not 
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prevent the very same conference from resolving to make arrangements for 
95 
the sugar workers to seek a Commonwealth Arbitration Court award. 
The apparent opposition to arbitration which McCormack and 
other AWA officials expressed at the 1913 AWA conference was in fact 
directed primarily at the New South Wales AWU. The latter's delegates 
to an amalgamation conference in June 1912 had shown great concern that 
a merger with the AWA would endanger the AWU's position under the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act and imperil the pastoral 
award. McCormack and Theodore were eager to reassure the AWU that the 
AWA had no desire to seek the jurisdiction of the federal court. The 
remarks at the 1913 conference were also directed at the AWA's own 
membership, the radical section of which feared that amalgamation with 
the AWU might circumscribe their industrial strength. McCormack hoped 
to allay their qualms by declaring that there was no plan to approach 
the court for an award covering North Queensland miners, "because today 
that trade enjoyed better conditions than they could get from an 
Arbitration Court award, and could secure better conditions by the 
methods ordinarily employed." 
When a Labor government took office in Queensland in 1915, 
Theodore and McCormack became staunch defenders of arbitration - indeed 
they came into bitter confrontation with trade unionists who refused 
to accept it. This was attributable in part to the differing 
responsibilities and aspirations of trade union officials and 
politicians. More importantly, however, the politicians believed that 
the disabilities under which trade unions had previously operated were 
in fact removed by ameliorative Labor legislation, notably the Trade 
Union Act of 1915 and the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916. These 
measures, both introduced by Theodore, Instituted an industrial court 
with both arbitral and legislative powers and provided for the 
registration of trade unions and the amalgamation of unions by 
agreement. 
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The AWA's attitude towards arbitration reflected the 
consistently pragmatic approach to trade union problems that its leaders 
always adopted and which indeed was the major factor in the union's 
phenomenal success. The leadership was not guided by theoretical 
considerations or socialist principles; rather it followed a practical, 
almost ad hoc policy of protecting the members' interests by whatever 
means possible, including direct action. This did not involve a 
deliberate policy of strike action, as claimed by Sullivan, nor a 
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consistent militancy, as claimed by Lane. The AWA preferred compromise 
to confrontation, conciliation to conflict; its leaders wanted to cope 
with capitalism, not overthrow it. 
Nevertheless, in the context of trade unionism in Queensland 
in this period, the AWA was certainly the most progressive and dynamic 
union in the state. Not only did it conduct successful strikes but it 
also pursued a policy of direct involvement in politics at a time when 
most trade unions were content to leave direct political organization 
to the Labor Party. Moreover, its actions were indeed militant by 
comparison with those of other Queensland unions which lay quiescent. 
The AWA did not seek strikes "deliberately" and "consistently", but 
neither did it avoid them as a means of furthering its objectives. If 
a strike appeared unavoidable, the union entered the dispute 
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